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ABSTRACT:  In adopting the democratic principle of multiparty elections in 1992, 
Kenyan politicians entered a new political world where accountability, a key characteristic 
of a functioning democracy, would be expected from leaders.  Throughout this paper I will 
analyze the evolving political accountability in the country from a historical perspective.  I 
will argue that the push for accountability by the voting public, the media and other civil 
society groups, and international donors and actors has been a highly contested and 
evolving battle as entrenched politicians have abused power in order to avoid being held 
accountable, thus allowing them to engage in politics as usual.  The evolution of political 
accountability in the Kenyan context will be judged based upon developments in the media, 
the judicial court system, and the involvement of international actors in domestic politics in 
the country.  
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The political structure of Kenya changed dramatically in 1992 when multiparty 
elections were held for the first time in the country’s history.  This development was a 
divergence from the country’s history as a one party state in which public dissent and 
oppositional politics were dealt with by violence, detention, and loss of access to political 
patronage.  In adopting the democratic principle of multiparty elections, Kenyan politicians 
entered a new political world where accountability, a key characteristic of a functioning 
democracy, would be expected from leaders.  Throughout this paper I will analyze the 
evolving political accountability in the country from a historical perspective.  I will argue 
that the push for accountability by the voting public, the media and other civil society 
groups, and international donors and actors has been a highly contested and evolving battle 
as entrenched politicians have abused power in order to avoid being held accountable, thus 
allowing them to engage in politics as usual.  The paper opens by indentifying a working 
definition of what political accountability is and its importance to democracy, followed by 
a discussion of accountability (or lack thereof) in Kenya.  Next, I turn toward different 
arenas where the game of political accountability manifests itself: the media, the judicial 
court system, and the involvement of international actors in domestic politics in the 
country.  
DEFINING ACCOUNTABILITY
Before analyzing political accountability in a particular context it is important to 
identify just what accountability is, and the role that it plays in a democratic political 
system.  An encyclopedic definition of the term indicates that it is “the ability to ensure that 
officials in government are answerable for their actions”1.  This definition is beneficial in 
1  Schedler, Andreas. 1999. Conceptualizing accountability. In The self-restraining state: Power and 
accountability in new democracies., eds. Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, 13-
27. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
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that there is definitely a correlation between “accountability” and “answers”, but there is 
also a lot more that goes into the word and processes surrounding it.  In the book The Self 
Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies, Andreas Schendler 
argues that there are two key concepts that are essential to political accountability: 
answerability (as mentioned above) and enforcement.  Schendler argues that answerability 
is defined by “the obligation of public officials to inform about and to explain what they 
are doing”2.  When “informing”, leaders must provide reliable facts on a given topic, 
whereas when “explaining” they must provide reasons for their actions.  Enforcement is 
“the capacity of accounting agencies to impose sanctions on powerholders who have 
violated their public duties”3.  In other words, it is the ability to reward good and punish 
bad behaviors.  In a democracy, this is most closely associated with citizens’ ability to cast 
a ballot in the upcoming election.  However, these elections must be accepted by the 
population, oppositional parties, and international observers to be “free and fair” for 
enforcement to have any meaning.  Schendler states that accountability that exposes 
misdeeds, but does not (or lacks the ability to) impose consequences on guilty parties is 
comparable to acts of window dressing rather than real restrains on power.  In addition to 
identifying the different connotations of accountability (answerability and enforcement), 
Schendler recognizes two major types of accountability: vertical and horizontal.  Vertical 
accountability is a relationship between unequal parties as powerful actors (elite 
politicians) are held accountable by inferior groups such as citizens, civil society groups, 
2  Schedler, Andreas. 1999. Conceptualizing accountability. In The self-restraining state: Power and 
accountability in new democracies., eds. Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, 13-
27. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
3 Schedler, Andreas. 1999. Conceptualizing accountability. In The self-restraining state: Power and 
accountability in new democracies., eds. Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, 13-27. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
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and the mass media.  Vertical accountability can also occur within the political system 
when higher ranking officials hold subordinates accountable.  Horizontal accountability 
concerns actors on a level playing field.  In democracies this occurs via the separation of 
powers between different branches of government that are able to enforce a system of 
checks and balances on one another.  In other words, the judiciary can hold the executive 
branch accountable, which has the same power over the legislative branch, and vice versa. 
These actors are all essentially equal and are thus able to police each other, possessing the 
ability for enforcement through use of impeachment, veto, etc.  
ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMOCRACY
Another key issue that needs to be addressed is the relationship between 
accountability and different political systems.  In authoritarian regimes (arguably what 
Kenya was as a one-party state before 1992) rulers are not held publicly accountable for 
their actions by the populace.  Ultimately, the authoritarian system prevents this from 
happening as there is a clear distinction between rulers and ruled that does not allow 
citizens to question their leaders.  This occurs because citizens living under authoritarian 
regimes often lack political rights such as the freedom of speech and suffrage that allow for 
questions to be asked, thus promoting accountability.  All that being said, accountability is 
not completely lacking under an authoritarian regime and is therefore not limited to 
democratic governments.  In fact, authoritarian leaders are accountable to various actors 
also.  For example, they are accountable to whoever put them in power (possibly 
international actors), and to those who have the capacity and power to remove them from 
power (often the military) if they deem it fit4.  The lack of accountability in authoritarian 
4  Baker, Bruce. 2000. Who should be called to account for good governance in Africa? 
Democratization 7, (2): 186-187. 
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regimes is in sharp contrast to the role and importance of accountability in a democratic 
political system.  The level of accountability in a country is often used by researchers to 
assess democratic quality and its long term viability in a particular context5.  Further 
illustrating the importance of accountability is the recent tendency by international 
organizations like the World Bank and IMF to tie economic aid with adoption of 
democratic principles of “good governance” such as transparency, a result of multimillion 
dollar corruption scandals that have plagued the African continent.  Ultimately, if 
democracy is accepted as “rule of the people” then the ability of those same people to exert 
influence (by maintaining accountability) onto their leaders is of upmost importance. 
“Without accountability ‘the rule of the people’ is emptied of all meaning for it is through 
this process that citizens ensure that all those who make decision for the whole community 
are able to justify those decisions as being in the interests of the community”6.  In other 
words, if elected leaders are inaccessible to citizens through two- way communication then 
accountability is lacking.  Furthermore, if the voting population is faced with a situation 
whereby all candidates have a history abusing power, then the strength of the democracy 
has to be seriously questioned.  In fact, many democratic theorists claim that the solitary 
use of elections to ensure accountability is not enough7.  Speaking on the matter, Baker 
claims that 
“It is not clear how effective the threat of punishment in a future election is on 
current government policy in situations where a degree of continuity among party 
5  Introduction. In 1999. The self-restraining state: Power and accountability in new democracies., eds. 
Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
6 Baker, Bruce. 2000. Who should be called to account for good governance in Africa? Democratization 7, 
(2): 186-210.
7  Introduction. In 1999. The self-restraining state: Power and accountability in new democracies., eds. 
Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
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alternatives does not exist, party policies are not well defined and voting is highly 
volatile.  In addition, where incumbents have been dreamed to abuse the electoral 
system to their own advantage, it has proved relatively easy to manipulate results 
despite observers and commissions”8 
Another example detailing the faults of relying solely on elections is if politicians are able 
to campaign on what is politically popular, but then divert from these campaign promises 
with the only sanction being not reelected after their term is over.  In this case, the will of 
the people has been put off until the next election, and there is no guarantee that the next 
candidate will uphold his promises either.  Thus, accountability has to be an ongoing, 
everyday process whereby politicians are subject to questions of “answerability” and 
possible “enforcement” on a continuing basis.
ACCOUNTABILITY AND IMPUNITY IN KENYA
 Kenya is a glaring example of the need for improved accountability as the political 
history of the country since multiparty elections in 1992 is one that has been plagued by 
“bad governance, divisive ethnic based politics, tribal clashes, massacres, gross violations 
of human rights, gender violence, dehumanizing poverty, high-level corruption, economic 
stagnation, and impunity”9.  Following a failed coup attempt in 1982, President Daniel arap 
Moi consolidated his power over the three branches of government through a series of laws 
that allowed him to dominate the political system.  The Constitution was amended the same 
year establishing KANU, Moi’s party, as the only legal party in the country.  Furthermore, 
8  Baker, Bruce. 2000. Who should be called to account for good governance in Africa? 
Democratization 7, (2): 203-204. 
9 Maathai, Wangari.  “Scrap Constituencies and Empower Local Authorities.” Daily Nation, November 16, 
2009, .
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dissent of the government was severely repressed through arrest, detention, torture, and 
killings that resulted in a culture of “silence and fear”10 that plagued society.  Repression 
was not limited to citizens, as media sources were censored and several publications that 
were critical of the regime were simply outlawed or their editors intimidated into 
compliance.  Human rights abuses during this time period are alleged to be significant, and 
were not helped by the fact that Moi possessed the ability to dismiss judges at will via a 
constitutional amendment11.  This situation persisted until international and domestic 
pressures forced Moi to repeal Section 2A of the constitution that had declared Kenya as a 
one party state, resulting in the first multiparty election in the country being held in 1992. 
However, Moi did not agree to do this on his own merit as he repeatedly refused to accept 
the idea of multiparty elections.  He repeatedly claimed that multiparty elections would 
lead to chaos12 up until international donors finally suspended financial aid to the country. 
Thus, the transition from a one-party authoritarian regime to a multiparty democracy 
began, and resulted in an increased demand for accountability of political actors.  Moi was 
able to win the 1992 and 1997 elections despite widespread irregularities that undermined 
the idea of a free and fair process.  Specifically, he enjoyed the ability to choose the 
members of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), and political boundaries were 
gerrymandered to the benefit of KANU.  For example, the Rift Valley Province (a KANU 
dominated area) which had 1,920,390 registered voters in 1992 was allocated 44 
parliamentary seats.  On the other hand, the opposition strongholds of Central and Nyanza 
Provinces with populations of 1,224,930 and 1,206,586 respectively were apportioned only 
10 Haugerud, Angelique. The Culture of Politics in Modern Kenya . Great Britain: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995.
11  Kenya. In 2008. Africa south of the Sahara 2009., ed. Iain Frame. 38th Edition ed., 586-620.
12 Haugerud, Angelique. The Culture of Politics in Modern Kenya . Great Britain: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995.
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25 and 29 parliamentary seats.  Furthermore, nearly four million youth, an opposition 
support group who had recently become eligible to vote were denied registration and thus 
marginalized.  Moi was also quick to intimidate and silence media members who were 
critical of his regime, and was able to use the state owned Kenya Broadcasting Company to 
highlight his party and disregard competitors.  Finally, outright fraud was alleged as voter 
turnouts exceeded 100% in some regions, and Moi even extended the amount of time to 
vote by one day, thus providing more time to ensure victory.  Clearly, these fraudulent 
elections do not speak well to the level of democracy or accountability in the country in the 
1990s (without even mentioning the widespread corruption).  Moi was essentially able to 
do whatever he had to do to win the election.  Despite no longer being an authoritarian 
state, Moi still enjoyed a monopoly on power as he was able to silence critics, and thus 
avoid questions of “answerability”.  Furthermore, the lack of any consequences 
(“enforceability”) for his actions, and his ability to manipulate the process gives credence 
to Baker’s argument that elections on their own are not enough to ensure accountability.  In 
many ways, “the government neither made nor allowed any steps in the pursuit of 
democratization, other than holding by-elections as required”13.
Ultimately, fast forwarding toward the present day (with different political actors) 
does not provide much different results.  Mwai Kibaki was elected in 2002 under an anti-
corruption campaign, and elections went relatively well in comparison to previous 
examples.  However, not long after taking office allegations of widespread corruption 
involving high ranking members of government began to leak out.  John Githongo, a 
13  Brown, Stephen. 2001. Authoritarian leaders and multiparty elections in Africa: How foreign donors 
help to keep Kenya's Daniel arap Moi in power. Third World Quarterly 22, (5): 732. 
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journalist appointed to an anti-corruption position in the government uncovered what came 
to be known as the Anglo-Leasing scandal in which hundreds of millions of dollars were 
embezzled through a contract that was given to a fake company.  Citing a lack of 
commitment to fight corruption by the government and threats to his life, Githongo was 
forced to flee in exile to the United Kingdom.  This development is both encouraging and 
troubling from an accountability standpoint.  On one hand, the fact that Githongo’s position 
in government even exists illustrates a commitment towards at least appearing to adhere to 
principles of accountability and transparency.  Furthermore, the fact that he refused to be 
bought off or silenced indicates there are individuals who are willing to take a stand against 
entrenched politicians.  That being said, nothing has become of Githongo’s allegations as 
those implicated have not faced any sort of negative consequences.  Additionally, the fact 
that Githongo received death threats points to the fact that politicians are committed to 
maintaining the status quo by any means necessary.  Baker argues that “the greater the 
neglect of public political aims, incompetence, corruption, and weakness, the more reason 
there is to evade accountability.  There is widespread reluctance to conduct their business 
in the open”14.  This statement sticks like glue to Kenyan political actors as there is a long 
and rich history of corruption scandals across multiple regimes, and a vested interest to stay 
in the good graces of international governments and organizations that provide the country 
with so much economic support.  Politicians understand that every time a corruption 
scandal is disclosed international investors become uneasy about exactly where their 
14  Baker, Bruce. 2000. Who should be called to account for good governance in Africa? 
Democratization 7, (2): 206. 
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money is going and often threaten to suspend aid.  Furthermore, they demand that measures 
be taken to ensure economic transparency in order to pacify their own shareholders.
The country’s most recent presidential election in 2007 was arguably a step 
backwards on the accountability spectrum as highly contested elections took a turn for the 
worse following relative peace on election day.  After the ECK delayed the election results 
amid widespread allegations of vote rigging, a sense of frustration and desire for victory in 
a winner take all system boiled over as widespread violence erupted across the country. 
Furthermore, there were allegations that much of the violence was politically orchestrated 
by members of the government.  The chaos resulted in the deaths of over 1,000 people and 
over 500,000 were internally displaced.  The violence only ended when the two main 
candidates, Kibaki and Raila Odinga, agreed to form a power sharing coalition government 
in an agreement mediated by Kofi Annan of the United Nations.  However, Jacqueline 
Klopp argues that creation of this power sharing government ensured impunity “since both 
parties include people guilty of corruption and violence, the grand coalition creates a 
common interest in perpetuating impunity and opposing the forces of accountability and 
transformation”15.  Ultimately, a Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence, also 
known as the Waki Commission, was formed and recommended the creation of a special 
tribunal in Kenya to prosecute those individuals who were responsible for orchestrating 
ethnic clashes.  However, in actions that are all too familiar in Kenya, politicians 
repeatedly haggled over and delayed the process until the deadline to create such tribunal 
had passed.  As a result, Annan handed over a fateful envelope filled with the names of 
those responsible for inciting the violence to the International Criminal Court16.  Politicians 
15 Klopp, Jacqueline M. "Kenya's Unfinished Agendas." Journal of International Affairs 62, no. 2 (2009): 
144.
16  "Kenya Police Ran 'Death Squads'." BBC News, February 25, 2009, .
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have clearly demonstrated their desire to repress the push for accountability based on their 
refusal to enact legislation that would indict those responsible.  In fact, some individuals 
who initially supported the idea of relying on the ICC for prosecution have flip-flopped17, 
and hope to create a local tribunal that can be manipulated to achieve their desired results, 
in other words continued impunity.  Some politicians have even argued that enforcement of 
accountability in the form of indictments and criminal trials would create a renewed threat 
of violence that could plunge the country into a civil war18.  This argument sounds similar 
to the one used by Moi that adoption of multiparty politics would lead to chaos, and it is 
evident that politicians are keen to use the fear card as a way of controlling the population 
when they dare to challenge the status quo.  Furthermore, politicians argue that handing the 
case over to the ICC would create the illusion that Kenya was a failed state which would 
have drastic consequences as the country attempts to attract foreign investors and tourists19. 
This argument is interesting as Kenya is not even comparable to the neighboring failed 
state of Somalia in terms of lacking a functioning government that can enact legislation, 
mobilize a military, and provide border security.  However, from the accountability 
perspective there is some merit to the classification of Kenya as a failed state.  For 
example, this exact same scenario occurred in the 1990s as the country had two other 
Commissions of Inquiry that named cabinet ministers as being responsible for inciting 
ethnic violence.  However, the recommendations of the reports “were never fully 
implemented, and those responsible were not held accountable20.  Time and time again 
17 Gaitho, Macharia. “Big Two Fail to Give Nod to ICC’s Forays.” Daily Nation, November 6, 2009, .
18 Wafula, Ken. "Special Tribunal Only Way Out." Daily Nation, November 16, 2009, .
19 Warah, Rasna. "After the Events of 2008, We Can't Claim Sovereignty." Daily Nation, November 16, 
2009, .
20  Klopp, Jacqueline M. 2009. Kenya's unfinished agendas. Journal of International Affairs 62, (2): 150. 
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politicians have proven that are not willing to adhere to the democratic principles of 
transparency, judicial independence, and acceptance of the rule of law.  Politicians have 
continued to act as if they are above the rule of law, and ensure impunity by manipulating 
the system to their benefit.  Ultimately, Kenyans politicians enjoy living in an environment 
that is lacking accountability as corruption scandals, political violence, and a lack of 
meaningful constitutional reform does not result in any significant consequences for 
anyone.  Politicians have essentially been able to engage in politics as usual that rely on the 
use of political patronage and divisive ethnic tribalism to ensure the voting population is 
busy fighting each other over access to valuable resources, rather than unifying to demand 
accountability from their leaders.  
THE MEDIA AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Now that we have analyzed accountability as a concept, and addressed its history in 
Kenya it is helpful to examine an arena where the struggle for increased accountability 
manifests itself.  Undoubtedly, one of the most important actors in the push for 
accountability is the media.  However, there is an important distinction that needs to be 
made between the state owned media, and a free and independent press.  State owned 
media in an authoritarian regime often performs the function of cheerleader and provides a 
forum for distribution of propaganda materials for the ruling regime.  Furthermore, 
neutrality by the state owned media is not enough, as they are encouraged to attack and 
refute those who criticize the government.  This practice is obviously a result of the fact 
that the government as owner of the organization possesses the ability to hire and fire 
journalists, and is the main means of economic support.  On the other hand, independent 
and free media sources perform the role of watchdog over governmental actors as they 
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report on instances of abuse of power such as corruption.  Some have even taken to 
comparing the press to a house-fly based on its habit of showing up when things start 
stinking21.  Ultimately, an independent media is an ally of citizens in a democracy as it asks 
critical questions of politicians on behalf of the entire community that demands them to 
provide information on recent developments and accompanying justifications for their 
actions.  When discussing the role of the media in a democracy Meiklejohn argued that:
“democracy is based on the notion of popular sovereignty.  This requires that 
citizens be well informed if they are to participate in the political process and 
effectively play their role as the ultimate decision makers.  A free and diverse press 
allows them to perceive a variegated view of issues on the basis of which they can 
make informed political decisions”22  
Furthermore, the media provides a market place for ideas whereby different views and 
claims can be made, but are then subjected to contestation which increases the chance for 
the truth to emerge and shape politics23.  In simple terms, the media educates the population 
about ongoing political developments, provides a forum for civic engagement, and works 
to promote accountability by demanding answers from political actors.  That being said, the 
media is engaged in a form of vertical accountability that lacks power of enforcement on 
those determined to have abused their power.  The media can only provide public 
disapproval, and are thus reliant on actors such as the judiciary (an equal to the executive) 
to sanction wrongdoing.  
21 Tettey, Wisdom J. 2001. The media and democratization in Africa: Contributions, constraints and 
concerns of the private press. Media, Culture, and Society 23, (1): 5-31.
22  Tettey, Wisdom J. 2001. The media and democratization in Africa: Contributions, constraints and 
concerns of the private press. Media, Culture, and Society 23, (1): 8. 
23  Tettey, Wisdom J. 2001. The media and democratization in Africa: Contributions, constraints and 
concerns of the private press. Media, Culture, and Society 23, (1): 5-31. 
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In the 1980s all but nine of Africa’s ninety daily newspapers were controlled by 
state governments, and the electronic media was fully in their control24.  However, the 
independent media saw substantial growth corresponding with the widespread transition 
towards democracy across Africa, and in turn helped to further accelerate the adoption of 
democratic principles by promoting accountability.  However, as mentioned earlier 
independent media sources in Kenya were often the victim of widespread repression under 
the Moi regime as journalists who were critical of government policies were arrested and 
often charged with sedition.  Additionally, some publications were outright banned. 
Countless journalists were silenced through indictments that took them to court under a 
guise of protecting state security that essentially undermined existing freedom of 
expression laws25.  Furthermore, journalists in Kenya that were lucky enough to have their 
case heard in court (the alternative being violent intimidation) were faced with a judiciary 
that continually ruled in favor of the executive branch.  In yet another example of state 
power, the government was also able to influence press policy by withdrawing advertising 
revenue from the publications which provides a key source of income for any media 
organization.  Media organizations that brought the ire of the President often were faced 
with diminished access to potential advertising customers as the government would pull 
their own advertisements in order to financially cripple and starve media organizations. 
Moreover, private businesses were made to understand that advertising in a newspaper that 
was critical of governmental policy was sure to bring unwanted results when these same 
businesses applied for necessary licenses and contracts which the state had control over.  In 
24 Tettey, Wisdom J. 2001. The media and democratization in Africa: Contributions, constraints and 
concerns of the private press. Media, Culture, and Society 23, (1): 5-31.
25  Adar, Korwa G. 2000. Assessing democratization trends in Kenya: A post-mortem of the Moi 
regime. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 38, (3): 103-30. 
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some cases the government was even been able to prevent a newspaper from ever being 
printed as they had strong influence over the media organization’s printing company26. 
Despite their beneficial role as a watchdog for political accountability there have 
been situations whereby the actions of members of the media have been counterproductive. 
Some of the new “alternative” media sources that appeared following the transition to 
democracy did not uphold high levels of professionalism as journalists printed stories that 
lacked factual evidence, or were essentially personal attacks that had nothing to do with 
important issues.  Furthermore, there have been instances where journalists have attempted 
to extort politicians by threatening to print damaging stories unless a bribe is paid.  These 
actions diminish the integrity of all media organizations, and give credence to the 
government’s argument that the press is involved in a personal vendetta against the state. 
Finally, some of the organizations further divide the populace by appealing to ethnic 
interests which does promote a unified population committed to demanding accountability. 
Another issue with the media is the fact that much of the population cannot afford a radio 
or television.  Even the cost of a single magazine exceeds the daily wages of urban 
workers, and is definitely out of reach for significant sections of the rural population27.  Not 
surprisingly, the majority of print and electronic media is consumed by the urban elite. 
Furthermore, the portion of the population who is illiterate is marginalized, and thus 
unequal access to media sources hinders the idea of an informed electorate who can hold 
politicians accountable.  
26  Tettey, Wisdom J. 2006. The politics of media accountability in Africa. The International  
Communication Gazette 68, (3): 229-48. 
27  Tettey, Wisdom J. 2001. The media and democratization in Africa: Contributions, constraints and 
concerns of the private press. Media, Culture, and Society 23, (1): 5-31. 
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INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
As witnessed by the refusal and inability of the judicial branch to uphold freedom 
of expression rights involving the media there are issues involving the “enforcement” 
aspect of accountability in Kenya.  The media has done a commendable job at promoting 
“answerability”, but true accountability is not realized if horizontal institutions such as the 
judiciary cannot impose sanction on wrongdoing.  
“If a police officer kills someone in custody without due cause and still walks free, 
it does not satisfy the principle of accountability if a journalist documents this 
abuse of authority…….Unless there is some punishment for demonstrated abuses 
of authority, there is no rule of law and no accountability”28
In a 1996 report the International Bar Association determined that the there does not seem 
to be a proper degree of independence between the judiciary and the main executive arm in 
Kenya29.  The ability of Moi to manipulate the judiciary in the past ensured that impunity 
would remain constant.  As a result of the power enjoyed by the Executive branch, cases 
were brought before “politically correct judges” who because of their desire to protect their 
jobs and secure state favors, were willing to do everything possible to rule in favor of the 
presidency30.  Furthermore, those judges who placed judicial integrity above the interests of 
the state were punished as evidenced by the transfer of a Chief Magistrate 130 km from 
28  Schedler, Andreas. 1999. Conceptualizing accountability. In The self-restraining state: Power and 
accountability in new democracies., eds. Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, 13-
27. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
29  Adar, Korwa G. 2000. Assessing democratization trends in Kenya: A post-mortem of the Moi 
regime. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 38, (3): 103-30. 
30 Adar, Korwa G. 2000. Assessing democratization trends in Kenya: A post-mortem of the Moi regime. 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 38, (3): 103-30.
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Nairobi in 1994 after he demanded an investigation into a suspect’s claims of police 
torture31.  Baker argues that the courts should ensure that the executive, public officials, and 
powerful private institutions and individuals are subject to the law and the constitution, and 
must have the capability to guarantee impartial justice32.   This can be accomplished if the 
judiciary is elected or appointed independently so that it can act without executive 
interference.  In the end, political actors must be forced to be accountable to both the 
people and the rule of the law.  In order for horizontal accountability to be realized, judges 
cannot defer to the state and leading politicians in matters that interest them.  
INTERNATIONAL ACTORS INVOLVEMENT IN DOMESTIC POLITICS
Increasingly, international actors have played a more important role in domestic 
politics in the Kenyan state.  For example, organizations like the Catholic Church, NGOs, 
and other civil society groups have increasingly demanded that the state fulfill its 
obligation to its citizens.  Many of these organizations have fearlessly brought attention to 
human rights abuses, and provide an important and powerful voice to the accountability 
concept of “answerability”.  Furthermore, international organizations such as the World 
Bank and IMF, in cooperation with other national governments, provide a substantial 
amount of economic funding to the country  Therefore, they have a vested interest in the 
politics of the country, and have often threatened to suspend aid upon discovery of 
corruption scandals or abuse of human rights.  Due to the government’s dependency on this 
money, these international actors have a valuable bargaining chip on their side that they 
can play to dictate policy.  However, some have argued that this relationship has made 
31 Adar, Korwa G. 2000. Assessing democratization trends in Kenya: A post-mortem of the Moi regime. 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 38, (3): 103-30.
32  Baker, Bruce. 2000. Who should be called to account for good governance in Africa? 
Democratization 7, (2): 186-210. 
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leaders in fact more accountable to external agencies than to their own electorate33. 
Stephen Brown argues that in Kenya, international donors actually discouraged measures 
that could have led to more comprehensive democratization during the 1992 and 1997 
elections which were plagued by instances of election fraud as discussed earlier.  Brown 
states:  
“They did this by knowingly endorsing unfair elections and subverting domestic 
efforts to secure far-reaching reforms.  In the face of anti-regime popular 
mobilization, donors’ primary concern appeared to be the avoidance of any path 
that could lead to a breakdown of the political and economic order, even if this 
meant legitimizing and prolonging the regime’s authoritarian rule”34
Brown argues that donors had spent 2.1 million dollars on the 1992 elections, and were 
determined to see them take place (even under unfair conditions), and felt that their 
procedural success outweighed the unfairness of the campaign35.  He even goes as far to 
claim that donors deliberately suppressed evidence that highlighted the irregularities of the 
election as an internal donor report named eight constituencies where the poll could not be 
considered valid (and thus the results of the entire elction), but in the public release of this 
document this information was deleted.  In rationalizing these actions Brown states that “in 
Kenya donors advocated a more democratic government hoping it would lead to better 
economic governance.  Yet they also feared instability that might accompany the transition 
33  Baker, Bruce. 2000. Who should be called to account for good governance in Africa? 
Democratization 7, (2): 186-210. 
34  Brown, Stephen. 2001. Authoritarian leaders and multiparty elections in Africa: How foreign donors 
help to keep Kenya's Daniel arap Moi in power. Third World Quarterly 22, (5): 735. 
35  Brown, Stephen. 2001. Authoritarian leaders and multiparty elections in Africa: How foreign donors 
help to keep Kenya's Daniel arap Moi in power. Third World Quarterly 22, (5): 725-39.
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to democracy, which would undermine economic reform”36.  As a result of the donors’ 
overemphasis of the process of elections (as discussed earlier by Baker), their interest in 
maintaining economic prosperity, and their refusal to condemn the widespread electoral 
fraud, the Moi regime was able to remain in power and delay further democratic reform. 
Obviously, this was an instance where these international actors had an opportunity to 
demand accountability from Kenyan politicians.  However, their refusal to do so set the 
stage for continued abuses of power, and a lack of accountability.         
Another important role that international organizations have played in developing 
democracies is as an election observer or monitor.  Organizations such as the United 
Nations, Organization of African Unity, and the Council of Freely Elected Heads of 
Government (which is coordinated by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter) have 
increasingly become more involved with democratic elections around the world.  Many 
times these groups are invited to oversee elections to provide a sense of legitimacy to the 
process.  In addition, the groups can mobilize vast resources and provide cutting edge 
technology that can be utilized during the election process.  Furthermore, if conflict arises 
between opposition parties these organizations can play the role of mediator.  Robert Pastor 
identifies this phenomenon as a “third dimension of accountability” and argues that “the 
presence of a prestigious group can deter electoral fraud and give local people a sense that 
their election has a larger importance (possibly increasing voter turnout)”37.  He goes on to 
say that: 
36  Brown, Stephen. 2001. Authoritarian leaders and multiparty elections in Africa: How foreign donors 
help to keep Kenya's Daniel arap Moi in power. Third World Quarterly 22, (5): 725-39. 
37  Pastor, Robert A. 1999. The third dimension of accountability: The international community in 
national elections. In , eds. Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, 123-142. 
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“the most difficult question for monitors to answer is whether the election has been 
free and fair.  To answer that effectively, monitors need to evaluate the entire 
electoral process.  Irregularities of some kind occur, and the problem is to try to 
determine a patter to the irregularities that could have biased the election in favor of 
a particular party or candidate”38 
However, Pastor argues that many of these international organizations are hesitant to 
criticize elections and rarely declare an election a fraud.  This is often because the country 
they are working in is a member of the same organization, thus a conflict of interest occurs. 
The ongoing involvement of the International Criminal Court in the fallout of deadly ethnic 
clashes following the 2007 election is an interesting comparison to the previous two 
examples.  The ICC, as an international policing organization, is not concerned with 
economic prosperity or offending the Kenyan state, rather their only interest is in bringing 
those politicians who incited ethnic violence to justice.  The ICC seems to be imposing 
horizontal accountability upon Kenyan politicians since they seem to be unwilling to do so 
themselves.  The argument can be made that the judiciary in Kenya is not a horizontal 
actor, rather a vertical one that works for the state to repress dissent.  However, Kenyan 
politicians are unable to manipulate the ICC and could be facing one of the first instances 
where horizontal accountability and enforcement will be enacted upon them.  Luis Moreno-
Ocampo, the chief prosecutor of the ICC, has even claimed to “use Kenya as a world 
example on how to fight impunity” and he is viewed as a savior by victims of the 
38  Pastor, Robert A. 1999. The third dimension of accountability: The international community in 
national elections. In , eds. Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, 123-142. 
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violence39.  This has resulted in a sense of optimism among the population who believe 
“the momentum against impunity is now unstoppable and will be far reaching.  It will not 
be confined to the post election violence.  It will involve many players and catch up with a 
wide range of crimes and misdeeds, past and present.  Impunity of every kind will come 
under siege40.   
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the push for political accountability in Kenya is an ongoing process. 
The media has enjoyed significant growth and plays a vital role in ensuring that the 
“answerability” aspect of accountability is addressed.  Furthermore, the culture of silence 
and fear has passed, and citizens and civil society groups today are empowered and are 
willing to speak out against governmental impunity.  However, the inability and reluctance 
of domestic courts to invoke any sort of “enforceability” upon powerful politicians is a 
clear example where accountability is failing.  Additionally, the tragic events that followed 
the 2007 elections and the refusal to address the issue by local politicians do not speak well 
to acceptance of the idea of accountability by political actors.  The involvement of the 
International Criminal Court in domestic issues is a new development, and its ability to 
impose negative sanctions on those who have abused power would send a strong message 
to Kenyan politicians that the old way of doing things has serious consequences.  In the 
end, “the reality is that the degree of accountability in a country is the outcome of the 
conflict between pressure from the populace and resistance from the power holders”41. 
39 Gekara, Emeka-Mayaka. "Horse-Loving Prosecutor Who Strikes Fear into Lords of Impunity." Daily 
Nation, November 6, 2009, .
40 Shaw, Robert. "At Last, the Diabolical Forces of Impunity are in Retreat." Daily Nation, November 18, 
2009,
41  Baker, Bruce. 2000. Who should be called to account for good governance in Africa? 
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Therefore, the level of accountability in the country will continue to evolve and be an 
ongoing and highly contested issue.
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